The myth of scientism in the evaluation of scientific evidence
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https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4574-6335
Abstract
This legal-reflective work, developed from a qualitative perspective with a literature review, aims at analyzing the rational attitude of judges regarding the scientific nature of the evidence. This paper sets out the difficulty encountered during the judiciary labor of justice administrators when evaluating the scientific evidence presented in different legal proceedings, since a set of extrajudicial information is required for that purpose. In most cases, this knowledge is non-existent. As a result, the judge is led to blindly trust what it is specified by the experts in their reports, thus, opening a door into the process to flawed evidence and allowing legal proceedings to be solved without a real assessment of them or the suitability of the expert.
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